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Introduction	  
	  The	  transfer	  of	  savings	  from	  one	  household	  to	  another	  creates	  a	  financial	  relationship	  between	   these	   households.	   Nearly	   always	   conditions	   of	   reward	   and	   repayment	   are	  attached	   to	   such	   a	   transfer.	   In	   a	  world	  where	   savings	   have	   grown	   to	   a	  multiple	   of	  annual	   economic	  output,	   the	   chances	   that	  debts	   can	   cause	  economic	   stagnation	  and	  major	  unemployment	  situations	  have	  risen	  strongly.	  This	  can	  both	  be	  on	  a	  national	  as	  well	  as	  on	  an	  international	  level.	  	  Debts	   can	   help	   households	   and	   governments	   to	   increase	   their	   spending	   power,	   but	  there	  is	  always	  a	  “cost”.	  Future	  income	  levels	  are	  needed	  to	  repay	  the	  debts.	  What	  is	  surprising	  is	  that	  economists	  have	  had	  such	  great	  difficulty	  in	  predicting	  when	  debts	  turn	   from	  a	  sound	  base	   into	  a	   threat	   to	  economic	  growth	   levels.	  Waiting	   till	  a	  crash	  happens	  as	  in	  2007-­‐2008	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  very	  sensible	  manner	  in	  running	  an	  economy.	  What	  is	  also	  surprising	  is	  how	  little	  power	  individual	  households	  have	  over	  the	   level	   of	   debts	   for	   which	   they	   carry	   the	   ultimate	   repayment	   responsibility,	  including	  government	  debt	  levels.	  	  Growing	   debt	   levels	   need	   to	   be	   analyzed	   extensively;	   but	   studying	   developments	   is	  not	   enough	   if	   brakes	   cannot	   or	   are	   not	   applied	   to	   stem	   a	   rapid	   growth	   in	   debt	  accumulation.	  	  Furthermore	  the	  structure	  of	  adding	  to	  debt	  levels	  has	  to	  be	  studied.	  The	  collective	  of	  banks	  rather	  than	  an	  individual	  bank	  in	  the	  U.S.	  created	  the	  home	  mortgage	  lending	  boom	   in	   the	   run	   up	   to	   2007.	   Capital	   markets	   assisted	   in	   funding	   such	   loans.	  Democratically	  elected	  governments	  can	  authorize	  excess	  levels	  of	  borrowings,	  which	  can	  bring	  the	  economy	  of	  a	  whole	  country	  down.	  The	  extensive	  use	  of	  debt	  funding	  for	  company	  mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   is	   another	   example	   of	   loading	  more	   debt	   to	   the	  company	   sector,	   which	   can	   cause	   further	   economic	   disruptions.	   Finally	   the	  international	   use	   of	   especially	   the	   U.S.	   dollar	   for	   borrowing	   purposes	  may	   pose	   its	  own	  threat	  to	  international	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  	  This	  paper	  focuses	  on	  the	  U.S.	  situation,	  especially	  from	  1997	  to	  today.	  This	  paper	  will	  conclude	  that	  the	  “debt	  problem”	  started	  with	  U.S.	  individual	  households	  in	  taking	  up	  excessive	  mortgages	  from	  as	  early	  as	  1998.	  Alarm	  bells	  should	  have	  started	  ringing	  in	  2002,	  when	  the	  mortgage	  debt	  allocations	  between	  building	  new	  homes	  and	  pushing	  up	  home	  prices	  in	  excess	  of	  income	  growth	  shifted	  to	  the	  latter.	  	  In	  2002	  62%	  of	  new	  funds	  was	   used	   for	   funding	   house	   price	   increases	   in	   excess	   of	   income	   growth.	   This	  trend	  continued	  all	  the	  way	  to	  2007.	  	  Another	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  problems	  accelerated	  from	  2009	  onwards.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  drop	  in	  taxes	  received	  was	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  the	  increased	  debt	  levels.	  Government	  debt	  problems	  followed	  the	  home	  mortgage	  crash.	  	  The	  cash	  injections	  from	  central	  banks	  after	  2008	  added	  to	  the	  world	  savings	  levels,	  which	  were	   already	   at	   high	   levels.	   The	   financial	   crisis	   of	   2007-­‐2008	  was	   a	   finance-­‐induced	  crisis.	  It	  was	  different	  from	  the	  oil	  price	  crisis	  of	  1973,	  which	  caused	  savings	  to	  flow	  to	  oil-­‐producing	  nations.	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1.	  Debt	  as	  a	  positive	  and	  a	  negative	  force	  
	  
1.1	  Characteristics	  of	  debt	  
	  Debts	  are	  incurred	  to	  add	  to	  income	  levels	  for	  both	  a	  government	  and	  for	  individual	  households.	  Companies	  borrow	  for	  a	  totally	  different	  purpose:	  they	  aim	  to	  create	  an	  income	  with	  the	  money	  obtained	  from	  others.	  Companies	  obtain	  outside	  funds	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  equity	  or	  in	  loans.	  	  	  Banks,	   as	   the	   distributors	   of	   people’s	   savings,	   should	   not	   be	   equated	   to	   ordinary	  companies.	   Their	   objectives	  might	   seem	   similar	   in	   trying	   to	  make	   a	   profit,	   but	   the	  effects	  of	  their	  actions	  are	  very	  different.	  Banks	  and	  the	  financial	  markets	  collectively	  decide	  who	  and	  how	  much	  debt	  governments,	   individual	  households	  and	  companies	  can	  take	  on.	  The	  competition	  element	  among	  banks	  and	  the	  misjudgments	  of	  risks	  can	  easily	   lead	   to	   the	   wrong	   volume	   of	   debt	   being	   granted	   to	   governments,	   individual	  households	   individually	  and	  collectively	  and	   to	  companies.	  The	  run	  up	   to	   the	  2007-­‐2008	   financial	   crisis	   clearly	   showed	   that	   the	  banking	  sector,	  particularly	   in	   the	  U.S.,	  but	  also	   in	  some	  other	  countries	   like	   in	  Spain	  and	  in	  the	  U.K.,	  played	  the	  key	  role	   in	  collectively	   increasing	   the	   volume	   of	   home	   mortgage	   loans	   far	   in	   excess	   of	   what	  individual	  households	  could	  absorb.	  Since	  then	  banks	  have	  gone	  through	  all	  kinds	  of	  stress	  tests.	  They	  have	  been	  hit	  with	  multiple	  fines	  by	  financial	  sector	  regulators	  and	  have	  subsequently	  adjusted	  balance	  sheets	  and	  risk	  taking.	  	  The	  IMF1	  has	  recently	  made	  an	  analysis	  of	  institutions	  other	  than	  banks	  that	  provide	  debt	  funds	  to	  the	  markets:	  the	  conventional	  asset	  managers.	  The	  latter	  savings	  levels	  were	   estimated	   to	   have	   reached	   over	   $75	   trillion,	  which	   is	   equal	   to	   about	   100%	  of	  world	   GDP.	   These	   asset	   managers	   have,	   among	   others	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	  quantitative	   easing	   by	   central	   banks,	   been	   buying	   up,	   governments,	   companies	   and	  even	   individual	  household	  debts	   in	   the	  world’s	  bond	  markets.	   In	   this	  manner	  credit	  intermediation	  has	  shifted	  from	  the	  banking	  to	  the	  non-­‐banking	  sector.	  	  What	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  past	  twenty	  years	  has	  shown	  is	  that	  the	  supply	  of	  funds	  is	  growing	   irrespective	  of	   the	   income	  earning	  capacities	  of	  both	   individual	  households	  and	  of	  governments.	  To	  enter	  into	  debts	  has	  been	  made	  easier	  an	  easier.	  The	  supply	  side	   -­‐supported	   by	   quantitative	   easing	   programs	   of	   central	   banks	   in	   all	   major	  countries-­‐	   has	   grown	  dramatically,	   but	   the	   income	   earning	   side	   has	   been	  unable	   to	  follow.	  The	  challenge	  for	  the	  future	  is	  how	  to	  manage	  to	  keep	  the	  supply	  of	  funds	  and	  income	  growth	  in	  balance.	  	  Debts	   should	   always	   be	   related	   to	   the	   income	   earning	   capacity	   of	   each	   type	   of	  household.	   For	   companies,	   debts	   and	   equity	   are	   a	  means	   to	   create	   an	   income.	   For	  governments	   and	   individual	   households	   debts	   are	   a	   means	   to	   enjoy	   more	  consumption.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/POL040815B.htm	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  Companies	   can	   make	   mistakes	   in	   estimating	   the	   demand	   level	   for	   their	   products.	  Their	  ultimate	  penalty	  is	  that	  they	  can	  go	  bankrupt	  and	  disappear.	  Governments	  and	  individual	  households	  do	  not	  disappear,	  but	  they	  certainly	  suffer	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  wrong	  levels	  of	  debt.	  	  	  A	  debt	  crisis	  can	  occur	  due	  to	  excess	  borrowing	  levels	  of	  a	  government	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time.	  Excess	  should	  be	  defined	  as	  borrowing	  levels	  growing	  faster	  than	  GDP	  levels.	  Individual	   households	   borrowing	   more	   than	   they	   can	   support	   out	   of	   their	   income	  levels	   can	   also	   cause	   a	   debt	   crisis.	   The	   key	   in	   understanding	   debts	   accumulation	   is	  that	  a	  “crisis”	  is	  the	  end	  result	  of	  a	  long	  period	  of	  overfunding.	  The	  current	  policies	  in	  place	  to	  tackle	  overfunding	  have	  shown	  to	  be	  rather	  ineffective	  in	  prevention	  of	  such	  crises	  occurring.	  	  Greece	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  government	  having	  borrowed	  for	  years	  more	  than	  their	  GDP	  growth	  levels.	  This	  can	  be	  called	  an	  “indirect”	  crisis.	  In	  such	  a	  crisis,	  the	  only	  way	  out	  is	   to	   get	   individual	   households	   to	   pay	   more	   taxes	   out	   of	   their	   incomes	   and	   for	   a	  government	  to	  reduce	  its	  spending	  levels.	  Both	  actions	  force	  the	  company	  sector	  into	  retrenchment	   actions.	   The	   so-­‐called	   “solutions”	   to	   solve	   the	   debt	   bubble	   force	   an	  economy	  into	  a	  deep	  decline,	  with	  very	  high	  unemployment	  levels.	  Debts	  and	  the	  level	  of	  debts	  become	  the	  negative	  force	  in	  an	  economy.	  	  In	   the	   U.S.	   the	   situation	   was	   different.	   From	   1998	   onwards,	   individual	   households	  started	   a	   borrowing	   spree	   to	   fund	   home	   acquisitions.	   Mortgage	   borrowings	   were	  entered	   into	   in	   a	   volume	   that	   not	   only	   led	   to	  more	   homes	   being	   build,	   but	   also	   of	  house	  prices	  to	  increase	  much	  faster	  than	  household’s	  income	  developments	  and	  the	  CPI	  index.	  The	  crisis	  that	  occurred	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  such	  overfunding	  levels	  can	  be	  called	  a	  “direct”	  crisis,	  as	  individual	  households	  were	  directly	  affected	  by	  the	  crisis.	  	  From	   2007	   onwards,	   the	   pressure	   on	   households	   to	   repay	   such	   debt	   led	   to	   many	  foreclosure	  procedures	  and	  also	   to	  5.6	  million	  homeowners	   losing	   their	  own	  homes	  altogether.	  Furthermore	  it	  led	  to	  consumer	  demand	  levels	  dropping	  as	  the	  priority	  for	  many	   households	  was	   to	   pay	   off	   debt	   first,	   before	   increasing	   spending	   levels.	   Both	  lower	   consumer	   demand	   and	   the	   subsequent	   unemployment	   deterioration	   very	  quickly	  led	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  accumulation	  from	  2009	  onwards.	  	  There	  are	  three	  main	  elements	  in	  any	  debt	  crisis:	  	  1.	  The	  volume	  and	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  volume	  of	  debt	  incurred	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  as	   any	   debt	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   capacity	   to	   repay	   the	   debt.	   For	   governments	   and	   for	  individual	  households	  their	  debt	  absorption	  capacity	  is	  their	  level	  of	  income	  and	  the	  growth	  therein.	  	  2.	   Debt	   is	   always	   linked	   to	   the	   debt	   providers,	   be	   they	   banks	   or	   other	   financial	  institutions	   like	   asset	   managers,	   pension	   funds,	   mutual	   funds	   and	   insurance	  companies.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Greece	   the	   IMF,	   the	   ECB	   and	   other	   EU	   government	  institutions	  did	  take	  over	  most	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  funding	  and	  became	  the	  “bankers”	  of	  last	  resort.	  Irrational	  exuberance	  often	  exists	  among	  debt	  providers.	  With	  many	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  players	  on	  the	  supply	  side	  of	  debt,	  micro	  and	  macro	  volume	  control	  of	  debts	  is	  one	  of	  the	   weakest	   elements	   in	   the	   granting	   of	   debts.	   Banking	   and	   financial	   markets	  supervisors,	  whose	  role	  it	  should	  be	  to	  manage	  macro-­‐volume	  levels	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  economic	  growth	  and	  unemployment	  levels,	  have	  generally	  shown	  a	  “laissez-­‐faire”	  attitude	  rather	  than	  an	  “hands-­‐on”	  one.	  	  	  3.	  The	  price	  of	  debt	  is	  often	  uncoupled	  from	  the	  risks.	  Higher	  volumes	  of	  debt	  do	  not	  necessarily	   lead	   to	   higher	   costs	   of	   funds.	   The	   price	   setting	   for	   long-­‐term	   individual	  household	  debt	  has	  not	  been	  based	  on	  volume	  growth	  either.	  
	  
1.2	  The	  positive	  impact	  of	  debt	  
	  For	  individual	  households	  taking	  on	  more	  debt	  provides	  a	  chance	  to	  spend	  more	  than	  their	  current	  income	  levels	  allow.	  For	  some	  acquisitions	  by	  households,	  using	  debt	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  acquire	  a	  home	  for	   instance,	   it	   is	  not	  only	   logical	  as	  the	  acquisition	  price	   is	  often	  a	  multiple	  of	  annual	  income	  or	  accumulated	  savings	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  way	  to	  grow	  future	  savings	  in	  the	  form	  of	  equity	  in	  the	  home.	  	  Taking	  on	  debt	  or	  increasing	  debt	  levels	  is	  based	  on	  expectations	  of	  a	  future	  growth	  in	  incomes	   for	   individual	   households.	   The	   positive	   force	   of	   debt	   –increasing	   the	  purchasing	  power	  of	  households-­‐	  will	  work	  as	  long	  as	  income	  expectations	  are	  met.	  If	  not,	  debt	  accumulation	  will	  work	  as	  a	  negative	  force	  on	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  	  There	  are	  other	  elements	  in	  a	  household’s	  debt	  structure.	  When	  buying	  a	  car,	  very	  few	  individual	  households	  expect	  the	  value	  of	  such	  car	  to	  go	  up	  over	  time.	  The	  use	  of	  a	  car	  will	  normally	  depreciate	  the	  value	  of	  a	  car.	  Taking	  out	  car-­‐loans	  is	  based	  on	  bringing	  forward	   the	   purchase	   date	   of	   a	   car	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   future	   income	   flows	   will	   be	  adequate	   to	   support	   the	   loan.	   The	   U.S.	   Balance	   Sheet	   of	   Households	   and	   Nonprofit	  Organizations2	  helps	   to	   show	   that	   there	   is	   a	   close	   correlation	   between	   the	   debt	  volume	   increase	   in	   car	   loans	   and	   the	   feel	   good	   factor	   in	   the	   economy.	  Debt	   growth	  helps	   the	   economy	   to	   grow	   when	   incomes	   grow	   simultaneously.	   The	   growth	   in	  consumer	  debt	  reinforces	  economic	  growth	  rates.	  	  Buying	  a	  home	  with	   the	  help	  of	  a	  mortgage	   is	  a	   totally	  different	  proposition.	  Firstly	  the	  mortgage	   period	   can	   easily	   stretch	   out	   over	   thirty	   years,	   rather	   than	   the	   usual	  three-­‐year	  period	   for	   consumer	   loans.	   Secondly	   the	  asset:	   the	  home	  can	   increase	  as	  well	   as	   decrease	   in	   value.	   A	   mortgage	   loan	   can	   help	   to	   speed	   up	   the	   price	   rise	   in	  homes,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  help	  to	  increase	  the	  volume	  of	  new	  homes	  being	  built.	  The	  latter	  helps	  house	  prices	  to	  grow	  slower	  and	  make	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  house	  prices	  stay	   in	  line	  with	  average	  income	  growth.	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  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-­‐5.pdf	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2	  The	  debt	  analysis	  process	  
	  
2.1	  The	  real	  question	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2.2	  The	  U.S.	  case	  	  In	  a	  paper:	  “The	  evil	  force	  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  Quantitative	  Easing”3	  it	  was	  explained	  how	  in	  the	  U.S.	  the	  annual	  volume	  increase	  in	  mortgage	  lending	  levels	  not	  only	  led	  to	  more	  homes	  being	  built,	  but	  also	  how	  home	  price	  rises	  absorbed	  the	  debt	  levels.	  
	  In	  the	  two	  tables	  below	  the	  increase	  in	  outstanding	  mortgage	  amounts	  was	  compared	  to	   the	   increase	   in	   median	   income	   levels.	   The	   latter	   was	   represented	   by	   the	   CPI	  increases	   over	   the	   period	   1997-­‐2008.	   	   This	   is	   an	   approximation	   as	   in	   prosperous	  years	  household	   incomes	  have	  a	   tendency	  to	  grow	  slightly	   faster	   than	  the	  CPI	   index	  and	  in	  less	  prosperous	  times,	  such	  income	  growth	  tends	  to	  fall	  behind	  the	  CPI	  index.	  	  	  
Table	  1:	  Money	   input	   –	  new	  housing	  output	   and	  average	  money	  allocated	  per	  
new	  home	  built	  over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2008	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
	  Year	  	   Increase	  in	  mortgage	  amounts	  x	  	  U.S.$	  billlion	  
Housing	  starts	  per	  1	  July	  on	  annualized	  basis	  x	  million	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  evil	  force	  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  Quantitative	  Easing	  by	  Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning,	  7	  February	  2015	  http://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/61970/	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Table	  2:	  Potential	  Housing	  starts	  based	  on	  CPI	  basis	  	  Year	  	   Increase	   in	  mortgage	  amounts	  x	  U.S.$	  billion	  
Housing	  starts	  per	  1	  July	  on	  annualized	  basis	   x	  million	  
Annual	  CPI	  Inflation	  	  %	  
Median	  house	  prices	  	  per	  1	  July	  based	  on	  CPI	  x	  U.S.$	  
Potential	   housing	  starts	  based	  	  on	  CPI	  x	  million	  
1997	   	  	  	  180	   1.437	   	   145,900	   1.437	  1998	   	  	  	  301	   1.698	   1.6	   148,234	   2.031	  1999	   	  	  	  377	   1.699	   2.2	   151,495	   2.489	  2000	   	  	  	  382	   1.463	   3.4	   156,645	   2.439	  2001	   	  	  	  509	   1.670	   2.8	   161,031	   3.161	  2002	   	  	  	  706	   1.655	   1.6	   163,607	   4.315	  2003	   	  	  	  881	   1.897	   2.3	   167,370	   5.264	  2004	   	  	  	  950	   2.002	   2.7	   171,889	   5.527	  2005	   1,053	   2.054	   3.4	   177,733	   5.925	  2006	   	  	  	  998	   1.737	   3.2	   183,420	   5.441	  2007	   	  	  	  701	   1.354	   2.9	   188,739	   3.714	  2008	   -­‐	  	  	  	  32	   	  	  .923	   3.8	   195,911	   negative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1997	   was	   chosen	   as	   the	   base	   year	   as	   in	   1997	   the	   volume	   increase	   in	   outstanding	  mortgage	  lending	  levels	  (U.S.$	  180	  billion)	  and	  the	  new	  housing	  starts	  per	  1	  July	  on	  an	  annualized	  basis	  (1.437	  million)	  led	  to	  an	  allocation	  for	  each	  new	  home	  of	  $125,260	  which	  was	  well	  below	  the	  median	  house	  price	  of	  $145,900	  in	  1997.	  	  Between	  1997	  and	  2005	  the	  annual	  volume	  increase	  in	  mortgages	  outstanding	  grew	  by	   nearly	   six	   times	   from	   $180	   billion	   in	   1997	   to	   $1053	   billion	   in	   2005.	   During	   the	  same	  period	  the	  new	  housing	  starts	  grew	  only	  by	  1.43	  times	  the	  1.437	  million	  housing	  starts	   in	  1997	   to	  2.054	  million	   in	  2005.	  Each	  new	  home	   start	   required	  $125,260	   in	  1997	   and	   $512,660	   in	   additional	   borrowings	   in	   2005.	   It	  was	   only	   in	   2004	   that	   the	  sub-­‐prime	   mortgage-­‐funding	   spree	   began	   in	   earnest	   and	   that	   mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  became	  widely	  used	  including	  the	  element	  of	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgages.	  	  Table	  2	  shows	  how	  much	  of	   the	  annual	   increase	   in	  mortgage	  amounts	  was	  used	   for	  keeping	  up	  with	   the	  CPI	   indexed	   level	   of	   new	  home	   starts	   and	   the	   excess	   over	   this	  level.	   The	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   levels	   reflects	   how	   fast	   house	   prices	   did	  increase	  over	  the	  mentioned	  period	  above	  the	  CPI	  indexed	  level.	  If	  the	  CPI	  level	  can	  be	  regarded	   as	   a	   level	   close	   to	   the	   median	   income	   growth	   levels	   in	   the	   U.S.	   over	   the	  period	   1997-­‐2005,	   than	   the	   calculations	   reflect	   the	   growing	   gap	   between	   income	  growth	  and	  mortgage	   funding.	   In	  1998	  $49	  billion	  out	  of	   the	   total	  of	  $301	  billion	  of	  the	  growth	  in	  mortgage	  funding	  was	  allocated	  to	  increase	  house	  prices	  above	  the	  CPI	  inflation	  level	  or	  16.3%	  of	  the	  funding.	  By	  2005	  $688	  billion	  out	  of	  the	  total	  $1053	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  billion	  was	  allocated	  for	  the	  same	  purpose	  or	  65.3%	  of	  all	  new	  funding	  was	  used	  for	  house	  price	  increases	  above	  the	  CPI	  index	  level.	  	  	  Economic	  alarm	  bells	  should	  have	  been	  ringing	  when	  debt	  volumes	  were	  increasing,	  especially	  of	   the	   long-­‐term	  variety	  of	  home	  mortgages	  and	  when	  such	   increase	  was	  outstripping	   households’	   income	   improvements.	   The	   1997-­‐2007	   U.S.	   pattern	   of	   the	  debt	   volume	   increases	   continuously	   kept	   raising	   the	   risk	   levels	   to	   individual	  households,	  to	  banks	  and	  ultimately	  to	  the	  whole	  economy.	  	  
Spotting	  the	  danger	  point	  
	  Banks	   call	   their	   mortgage	   loan	   portfolios	   sound	   when	   their	   customer	   base	   repays	  such	   loans	   according	   to	   the	   loan	   schedules	   agreed	   to.	  However	  macro-­‐economically	  speaking	  one	  can	  define	  a	  mortgage	  loan	  portfolio	  as	  unstable	  and	  thereby	  a	  threat	  to	  future	  economic	  growth	  rates	  when	  households’	   income	  growth	   levels	  are	  exceeded	  by	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  price	  levels	  of	  homes.	  	  In	   the	  U.S.	   such	   turning	  point	  was	   reached	   in	  2002.	   In	   this	   year	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  mortgage	  portfolio	  of	  $706	  billion	  was	  used	  for	  new	  home	  starts	  at	  the	  CPI	  index	  level	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  $271	  billion	  and	  the	  remainder	  to	  inflate	  house	  prices	  above	  the	  CPI	  level	   to	   the	  extent	  of	  $435	  billion.	  This	  distribution	   trend	  continued	  unabated	  up	   to	  and	  including	  2007	  without	  interruption.	  	  The	  year	  2002	  was	  well	  before	  the	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgage	  sales	  efforts,	  which	  started	  in	  all	  seriousness	  from	  2004	  onwards.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  narrow	  definition	  of	  “sound”	  levels	  of	  debt	  as	  defined	  by	  the	   banking	   sector	   and	   its	   macro-­‐economic	   definition	   lies	   in	   the	   threat	   to	   future	  defaults	   and	   their	   subsequent	   consequences.	  Banks	  have	  a	   short-­‐term	  profit	  motive	  and	   any	   household	   able	   to	   repay	   according	   to	   the	   agreed	   repayment	   schedule	   is	  regarded	  as	  sound	  as	  no	  loan	  loss	  provisions	  need	  to	  be	  made.	  Profits	  are	  maximized	  for	  the	  short	  term.	  Macro-­‐economically	  the	  fact	  that	   income	  growth	  and	  house	  price	  growth	  levels	  are	  on	  divergent	  tracks	  should	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  such	  a	  pattern	  is	  unsustainable	  and	  therefore	  action	  is	  needed.	  Short	  term	  banking	  profits	  and	  long-­‐term	  economic	   stability	   deviate.	   Financial	  markets	   provide	   the	  wrong	  profit	   signals	  for	  future	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  	  Having	   assessed	   that	   the	  macro-­‐economic	   danger	   point	  was	   reached	   in	   2002	  what	  could	  have	  been	  done	  about	  it.	  	  
Making	  choices	  	  A	  key	  question	  to	  be	  raised	  is	  whether	  the	  interest	  rate	  tool	  is	  a	  suitable	  instrument	  for	   correcting	   a	   deficiency	   in	   households’	   income	   growth.	   An	   income	   growth	  deficiency	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   a	   growth	   in	   income	   levels	   slower	   than	   the	   growth	   in	  (long-­‐term)	  debt	  levels.	  When	  (mortgage)	  debt	  levels	  grow	  faster	  than	  income	  levels,	  does	  one	  try	  to	  slowdown	  such	  debt	  growth	  by	  raising	  the	  price	  of	  new	  (and	  variable	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  rate)	  debt	  or	  by	  limiting	  access	  to	  new	  debt?	  This	  was	  the	  real	  choice	  that	  could	  have	  been	  made.	  Does	  one	  restrict	  the	  supply	  side	  of	  debt	  so	  that	  potential	  new	  debt	  users	  have	   a	  more	   restricted	   access	   to	   debt	   levels,	   or	   does	   one	   increase	   the	  price	   of	   new	  debt?	  	  Increasing	  the	  costs	  of	  borrowing	  does	  not	  help	  households	  to	  improve	  their	  income	  levels,	   but	   it	   achieves	   rather	   the	  opposite	   effect.	  Raising	   interest	   rates	  punishes	   the	  borrowers	  rather	  than	  the	  lenders.	  	  What	  might	   have	   been	   done	   in	   2002	  was	   to	   increase	   the	   reserve	   requirements	   for	  banks,	   including	   for	   Fannie	   Mae	   and	   Freddy	   Mac.	   What	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   home	  mortgage	  lending	  data	  indicated	  was	  that	  from	  2002	  the	  allocation	  of	  mortgage	  funds	  used	  for	  new	  home	  starts	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  income	  growth	  levels	  ($271	  billion)	  was	  far	  exceeded	   by	   the	   funds	   allocated	   to	   house	   price	   inflation	   above	   the	   CPI	   level	   ($435	  billion).	  2002	  was	  the	  first	  year	  that	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  new	  mortgage	  funding	  was	  not	  used	  to	  build	  more	  homes	  but	  to	  inflate	  house	  prices	  above	  the	  CPI	  index	  level	  (1997	  was	  used	  as	  the	  base).	  	  What	   did	   happen	  was	   that	   the	   Fed	   lowered	   its	   base	   rate	   of	   6%	   in	   January	   2001	   to	  1.75%	   in	   December	   of	   the	   same	   year.	  With	   a	   further	   dip	   to	   1%	   in	   2003	   such	   rate	  continued	  to	  June	  2004	  when	  it	  was	  raised	  to	  1.25%.	  	  The	   applied	   base	   rate	   changes	   did	   not	   reverse	   the	   threats	   caused	   by	   the	  mortgage	  lending	  effects	  to	  future	  economic	  growth	  patterns,	  but	  rather	  reinforced	  the	  trend.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  question:	  Are	  making	  interest	  rate	  changes	  the	  appropriate	  tool	  for	  reining	   in	   excess	   lending	   levels?	   Should	   companies,	   a	   government	   and	   individual	  households	  all	  have	  access	  to	  borrowings	  based	  on	  an	  identical	  Fed	  funds	  rate?	  	  Economic	  output	  is	  based	  on	  consumption,	  investments	  and	  government	  expenditure.	  Each	  economy	  depends	  on	  individual	  households.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  in	  2014	  consumption	  by	  individual	  households	  contributed	  to	  68.5%	  of	  the	  U.S.	  GDP	  of	  $17.4	  trillion.	  Ignoring	  to	  what	  happens	  to	  the	  financial	  position	  of	  such	  households	  is	  equal	  to	  ignoring	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  households	  for	  the	  economic	  prosperity	  of	  the	  country.	  	  	  Therefore	   if	   the	   growths	   in	   mortgage	   debts	   contain	   a	   threat	   to	   future	   economic	  growth	  levels,	  this	  is	  not	  only	  an	  issue	  for	  individual	  households.	  	  When	  the	  financial	  markets	  do	  not	  provide	  the	  right	  guidance,	  as	  their	  profit	  levels	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  risks	  to	  future	  economic	  growth	  levels,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  authorities	  to	  take	  appropriate	  action.	  In	   2002	   the	   threat	   to	   future	   economic	   growth	   levels	   came	   from	   the	   individual	  households’	   sector,	   some	   of	   it	   from	   the	   companies	   sector	   with	   no	   threat	   from	  government	  spending.	  	  Over	   the	   period	   March	   2000	   to	   October	   2002	   the	   dot.com	   bubble	   had	   burst	   and	  investors	  had	  lost	  about	  $5	  trillion	  in	  savings	  values;	  much	  of	  it	  were	  realized	  losses	  as	  dot.com	  companies	  went	  bankrupt.	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  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  due	  to	  the	  dot.com	  bubble,	  the	  fear	  factor	   in	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  had	  	  grown	  dramatically,	  hence	  the	  decision	  by	  the	  Fed	  to	  lower	  its	  base	  rate	  from	  6%	  on	  January	  3	  2001	  to	  1.75%	  on	  December	  11th	  of	  the	  same	  year.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  housing	  market	  as	  compared	  to	  households’	  income	  growth	  did	  require	  a	  slow-­‐down	  in	  mortgage	  lending.	  	  It	  will	  be	  clear	  that	  these	  two	  objectives:	  lower	  the	  fear	  factor	  in	  the	  overall	  economy	  and	  managing	   a	   slow-­‐down	   in	  mortgage	   lending	   could	  not	   be	   achieved	   through	   the	  sole	   use	   of	   the	   interest	   rate	  mechanism.	   The	   first	   objective	   required	   lower	   interest	  levels	   and	   the	   second	   one	   of	   slowing	   down	   mortgage	   lending	   certainly	   would	   not	  include	  lowering	  of	  interest	  rates.	  	  Another	  element	  to	  consider	  is	  what	  happened	  after	  2008.	  	  Over	   the	   period	   2008-­‐current,	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   as	   provided	   by	   the	   Balance	  Sheet	  of	  Households	  and	  Nonprofit	  Organizations,	  shows	  that	  base	  rate	  changes	  have	  not	  had	  any	  effect	  on	  the	  volume	  of	  outstanding	  home	  mortgages	  in	  the	  U.S.	  The	  Fed	  funds	  rate	  was	  4.25%	  per	  end	  of	  2007	  and	  was	  reduced	  to	  0.25%	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2008.	  Per	   the	   end	   of	   2007	   the	   total	   volume	   of	   outstanding	   home	  mortgages	  was	   $10.613	  trillion.	   Per	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   quarter	   2015	   the	   total	   outstanding	   level	   had	   been	  reduced	   to	   $9.370	   trillion,	   while	   the	   base	   rate	   has	   been	   kept	   at	   0.25%	   during	   this	  whole	  period.	  The	  home	  mortgage	  loan	  volume	  went	  down	  by	  some	  12%	  over	  the	  last	  seven	  years	  while	  the	  base	  rate	  was	  maintained	  at	  its	  lowest	  level	  ever.	  Costs	  of	  funds	  influenced	   individual	   households	   the	   least;	   repayment	   of	   loans	   had	   the	   higher	  priority.	  	  Making	  choices	  is	  not	  only	  making	  choices	  for	  all	  households	  together:	  a	  government,	  companies	   and	   the	   individual	   households,	   but	   also	  making	   choices	   for	   each	   type	   of	  household	  as	  distinct	  from	  other	  households.	  Each	  type	  of	  household	  can	  originate	  a	  threat	  to	  future	  economic	  growth	  rates.	  	  
3	  Collective	  debt	  levels	  
	  
3.1	  The	  lenders	  side	  
	  In	  the	  U.S.	  in	  1987	  there	  were	  practically	  14000	  banks	  and	  deposit	  taking	  institutions.	  These	   institutions	   had	   collectively	   some	   $2.5	   trillion	   of	   deposits.	   As	   per	   end	   of	  September	   2013	   there	   were	   6891	   banking	   organizations	   and	   they	   had	   collectively	  $9.6	  trillion	  on	  deposits.	  The	  number	  of	  banking	  institutions	  has	  been	  falling,	  but	  the	  average	  size	  per	  bank	  has	  been	  growing	  substantially.	  Many	  smaller	  banks	  merged	  or	  were	  taken	  over	  and	  the	  larger	  banks	  grew	  in	  size	  rather	  than	  in	  numbers.	  	  However	  what	  this	  all	  means	  is	  that	  there	  were	  and	  are	  still	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  home	  mortgage	  lending	  markets.	  Each	  participant	  decides	  on	  itself,	  which	  mortgage	  amount	  to	  lend	  and	  to	  whom.	  Competition	  between	  banks	  still	  means	  for	  each	  bank	  that	  the	  mortgage	  interest	  received	  will	  always	  exceed	  their	  costs	  of	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  funds.	   Banks	   also	   feel	  more	   comfortable	   if	   the	   asset	   (home)	   price	   goes	   up,	   thereby	  improving,	   in	   their	  eyes,	   the	   loan	   to	  asset	   ratio.	  Banks	  seek	  profits	   from	  their	  home	  mortgage	  portfolio.	  In	  2002	  banks	  would	  have	  considered	  the	  substantial	  drop	  in	  the	  base	   rate	   in	   2001	   from	   6%	   to	   1.75%	   per	   December	   of	   that	   year	   a	   bonus,	   as	  more	  customers	  would	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  a	  higher	  volume	  of	  mortgage	  debt.	  Banks	  would	  not	  have	  regarded	  the	  fact	  that	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  new	  mortgage	  funds	  were	  to	  be	  used	  to	  inflate	   house	   prices	   above	   the	   CPI	   index	   and	   the	   income	   earning	   capacity	   of	  households	   as	   anything	   to	   worry	   about.	   The	   profit	   motive	   would	   steer	   them	  collectively	  in	  the	  wrong	  direction.	  	  Under	  these	  circumstances	  the	  lenders	  themselves	  would	  not	  show	  any	  inclination	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  lending	  process.	  Only	  regulatory	  intervention	  could	  have	  done	  the	  job.	  	  From	  2004	  the	  process	  of	  securitization	  of	  mortgages	  was	  growing	  rapidly.	  Not	  only	  did	   banks	   lay	   off	   risks	   on	   their	   customer	   base	   by	   transferring	   such	   risks	   to	   third	  parties,	   it	   also	   opened	   the	   floodgates	   for	   more	  mortgage	   lending.	   Most	   of	   the	   new	  mortgage	   lending	   ended	   up	   in	   pushing	   house	   prices	   further	   above	   average	   income	  growth.	  	  Having	  mutual	  funds,	  pension	  funds	  and	  even	  money	  market	  funds	  investing	  in	   home	   mortgage	   backed	   securities	   took	   away	   the	   potential	   buffer	   that	   banks	  provided,	  through	  their	  equity	  base,	  in	  absorbing	  loan	  losses.	  	  The	  fact	  is	  that	  the	  Fed	  increased	  the	  base	  rate	  from	  1.25%	  at	  June	  30	  2004	  gradually	  to	  5.25%	  by	   June	  29	  2006.	  The	  Fed	  may	  have	  been	  aiming	   to	   slow	  down	  mortgage	  lending	  and	  the	  economy	  in	  general,	  but	  the	  structure	  of	  home	  mortgage	  lending	  had	  changed	  by	   that	   time.	  Securitization	  plus	   the	  mortgage	  products	  on	  offer:	   low	  or	  no	  down	   payments;	   below	   market	   interest	   rates	   for	   two	   years;	   and	   a	   wider	   use	   of	  variable	   interest	   rates	  at	  a	   time	   that	  house	  prices	   far	  exceeded	   income	   levels,	  made	  the	  crash	  a	  near	  certainty.	  The	  interest	  rate	  setting	  did	  not	  help	  the	  picture.	  Ultimately	  the	   lack	  of	   liquidity	   in	  the	  mortgage	  backed	  securities	  markets	  killed	  off	  any	  further	  growth	  in	  mortgage	  lending.	  As	  already	  stated,	  as	  per	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  quarter	  2015	  the	  outstanding	  mortgage	  volume	   lending	   level	   is	   still	   some	  12%	  below	   the	   level	  of	  December	  2007.	  This	  is	  in	  actual	  amounts	  and	  not	  corrected	  for	  inflation	  levels.	  	  
3.2	  The	  U.S.	  government’s	  own	  debt	  situation	  
	  In	  fiscal	  year	  2007	  the	  U.S.	  (Federal)	  government	  ran	  a	  budget	  deficit	  of	  $160	  billion4	  and	  had	  a	  gross	  public	  debt	  level	  as	  per	  the	  end	  of	  fiscal	  2007	  of	  $8.951	  trillion.	  The	  accumulated	   deficits	   since	   2007	   including	   the	   2014	   deficit	   amounted	   to	   $6.710	  trillion.	   This	  would	   lead	   to	   a	   debt	   situation	   of	   $15.661	   trillion.	   However	   the	   actual	  debt	  level	  was	  $2.133	  trillion	  more	  and	  had	  risen	  to	  $17.794	  trillion	  as	  per	  the	  end	  of	  fiscal	   2014.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   difference	  were	   the	   obligations	   for	   State	   sponsored	  enterprises	  such	  as	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddy	  Mac.	  	  In	  this	  connection	  it	  is	  important	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  http://www.usgovernmentdebt.us/debt_deficit_history	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  Debts	  should	  come	  with	  a	  serious	  economic	  health	  warning!©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  	  note	  that	  about	  $2.4	  trillion	  of	  this	  debt	  outstanding	  was	  financed	  by	  the	  Fed	  through	  its	  quantitative	  easing	  exercise.	  	  In	  2014	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  to	  GDP	  (federal,	  state	  and	  local)	  reached	  120.6%	  while	  interest	  payments	  were	  running	  at	  1.3%	  of	  GDP.	   In	  2007	  the	  debt	   level	  represented	  78%	  of	  GDP.	  	  If	   the	  mortgage-­‐lending	   crisis	   had	   not	   happened	   or	   had	   been	   prevented	   to	   happen,	  what	  would	   the	  U.S.	  government’s	  debt	   level	  have	   looked	   like	   in	  2015?	   If	  an	  annual	  deficit	  of	  $160	  billion	  had	  continued	  from	  2007	  till	  fiscal	  year	  2014	  the	  government’s	  debt	  level	  would	  have	  been	  $5.6	  trillion	  less	  than	  the	  current	  level.	  Add	  on	  top	  of	  this	  the	   $2.1	   trillion	   difference	   between	   actual	   debt	   level	   and	   the	   level	   based	   on	  government	  deficit	  funding,	  than	  the	  total	  debt	  prevention	  level	  would	  have	  reached	  $7.7	  trillion.	  In	  other	  words	  the	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  level	  would	  have	  increased	  from	  $8.951	  trillion	  in	  2007	  to	  $10.1	  trillion	  in	  2014.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  did	  not	  reach	  $10.1	  trillion	  in	  2014	  was	  due	  to	  the	  after	  effects	  of	  the	  mortgage	   backed	   financial	   crisis.	   The	   “economic	   costs”	   of	   the	   2008	   financial	   crisis	  were	  an	  increased	  debt	  burden	  for	  all	  U.S.	  citizens	  of	  $7.7	  trillion.	  With	  an	  estimated	  population	   in	   the	  U.S	  of	  317.3	  million	   in	  2014	   this	  meant	   an	   increase	  of	   $24,267	   in	  government	  debt	  per	  capita	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008.	  	  While	   the	   interest	  burden	  may	  not	  be	  to	  onerous	  with	   interest	  rates	  at	  rock	  bottom	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  the	  increase	  in	  principal	  debt	  per	  capita	  should	  be	  a	  warning	  signal	  to	  avoid	  any	  future	  individual	  household	  mortgage	  debt	  to	  grow	  out	  of	  hand.	  In	  a	  way	  the	  mortgage	  debt	  of	  some	  households	  have	  been	  transferred	  to	  become	  a	  burden	  to	  all	  U.S.	  citizens.	  	  	  
3.3	  Debt	  resolutions	  
	  Spotting	   the	  danger	  point	   in	   lending	   to	  governments	   is	  even	  more	  difficult	   than	   the	  one	   for	   individual	   households.	   There	   is	   no	   world	   financial	   supervisor	   that	   tells	   a	  government	   that	   their	   borrowing	   behavior	   constitutes	   a	   threat	   to	   their	   future	  economic	  growth	  rates.	  There	  are	  also	  no	  mechanisms	  in	  place	  to	  stop	  governments	  from	  borrowing	  more.	  	  In	   the	  short	   term	  a	  government’s	   largesse	   to	   its	  civil	   servants	  and	   to	   the	  many	  who	  depend	  on	  social	   security	  payments	  may	  help	   to	  get	   it	   the	  popular	   support	   through	  the	   ballot	   box.	   Austerity	   policies	   always	   involve	   some	   groups	   losing	   out.	   Adding	  additional	  government	  debt	  to	  already	  high	  debt	  levels	  works	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  as	   debt	   levels	   for	   individual	   households.	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   enter	   into	   and	   much	   more	  difficult	  when	  repayments	  become	  due.	  	  The	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  has	  been	  set	  up	  as	  a	  lender	  of	  last	  resort,	  but	  by	  the	  time	  that	  its	  funds	  are	  needed,	  a	  country	  has	  long	  past	  its	  danger	  point.	  	  What	  the	  IMF	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  Debts	  should	  come	  with	  a	  serious	  economic	  health	  warning!©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  requires	   as	   part	   of	   its	   funding	   package	   is	   that	   structural	   changes	   are	   made	   in	   an	  economy,	   something	   that	   private	   lenders	   never	   do.	   Again	   structural	   changes	  would	  have	   been	   much	   more	   effective	   if	   the	   danger	   point	   signaling	   system	   would	   work	  better	  and	  when	  there	  are	  penalties	  for	  not	  following	  up	  on	  the	  changes.	  Co-­‐operation	  between	  the	  Fed,	  the	  ECB,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  the	  People’s	  Bank	  of	  China,	  the	  Bank	  of	   Japan	   and	   some	   other	   central	   banks	   from	   major	   lending	   nations	   could	   force	  financial	   institutions	  under	  their	  control	  to	  stop	  lending	  or	  make	  such	  lending	  much	  less	   attractive.	   By	   publishing	   such	   action	   to	   the	   financial	   markets,	   this	   will	   put	  financial	  pressure	  on	  the	  country	  concerned	  to	  change	  its	  course	  of	  operations.	  	  Prevention	   rather	   than	   curing	   a	   collapse	   of	   an	   economy	   is	   much	   preferable.	  Prevention	  does	  not	   lead	   to	   the	  high	   levels	  of	  unemployment	  and	   income	   losses	   for	  individual	  households.	  	  
3.4	  A	  more	  democratic	  system	  of	  government	  spending	  areas	  





• Debts	  of	  individual	  households	  and	  of	  governments	  should	  always	  be	  linked	  to	  their	  income	  earning	  capacity.	  
	  
• The	   real	   question	   is	   when	   move	   debts	   from	   an	   “affordable	   level”	   to	   an	  “unaffordable	  “	  one?	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• Banks	   and	   other	   financial	   institutions	   cannot	   answer	   this	   question	   as	   their	  profit	  guidance	  declares	  any	  client	  who	  maintains	  payments	  according	   to	   the	  loan	  agreement	  as	  current	  and	  no	  loan	  loss	  provisions	  need	  to	  be	  made.	  Banks’	  profits	  are	  no	  guidance	  to	  threats	  to	  future	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  	  
• The	   real	   threat	   to	   future	   economic	   growth	   levels	   in	   the	   U.S.	   came	   in	   2002,	  when	   new	   home	  mortgage	   loans	   were	   used	   for	   more	   than	   50%	   to	   push	   up	  house	  prices	  in	  excess	  of	  households’	   income	  growth	  levels.	  Debt	  and	  income	  levels	  were	  on	  a	  divergent	  path.	  This	  pattern	  continued	  to	  2007.	  	  
• In	  2001	  and	  2002	  the	  Fed	  was	  faced	  with	  another	  “bubble”	  the	  dot.com	  boom	  and	  bust.	  Investors	  lost	  some	  $5	  trillion,	  much	  of	  it	  realized.	  The	  fear	  factor	  had	  set	  in	  and	  the	  Fed	  lowered	  its	  base	  rate	  from	  6%	  to	  1.75%	  in	  2001.	  From	  the	  dot.com	  bubble’s	  side	  fully	  understandable;	  from	  a	  mortgage	  restraint	  point	  of	  view	   inappropriate.	   The	   lesson	   is	   that	   two	   “bubbles”:	   the	  mortgage	   and	   the	  dot.com	   ones	   cannot	   be	   solved	   by	   one	   instrument	   only:	   the	   interest	   rate	  setting.	  	  
• What	  could	  have	  been	  done	  in	  2002	  was	  to	  use	  an	  instrument	  specifically	  for	  reining	  in	  the	  home	  mortgage	  markets:	  increasing	  reserves	  requirements.	  This	  could	   have	   been	   done	   not	   only	   for	   the	   banks	   but	   also	   for	   Fannie	   Mae	   and	  Freddy	  Mac.	  	  
• Until	  2007	   the	   choice	   in	  managing	   the	  mortgage	  debt	  and	   income	   levels	  was	  one	   between	   restraining	   the	   lending	   side	   or	   making	   borrowings	   more	  unattractive.	  The	  Fed	  chose	  for	  the	  latter.	  It	  raised	  the	  base	  rate	  from	  1.25%	  in	  June	  2004	  to	  5.25%	  in	   June	  2006.	  Regretfully	   the	  banking	  sector	  had	   latched	  onto	   mortgage-­‐backed	   securities	   and	   had	   changed	   the	   mortgage	   conditions	  with	   below	   market	   rates	   for	   two	   years,	   low	   or	   no	   down	   payments	   to	   a	  subprime	   customer	   base.	  Mortgage	   risks	  were	   transferred	   to	   other	   financial	  institutions,	   like	  mutual	   funds,	  pension	   funds	  and	  even	  money	  market	   funds.	  Lack	  of	  liquidity	  in	  these	  bonds	  led	  to	  the	  crash	  of	  2008.	  	  
• In	  the	  period	  after	  2008	  individual	  households	  preferred	  (or	  were	  forced)	  into	  repaying	   mortgage	   loans.	   Some	   12%	   of	   the	   total	   volume	   of	   outstanding	  mortgages	   was	   repaid	   to	   the	   lenders.	   This	   happened	   notwithstanding	   that	  borrowing	   rates	  were	   at	   their	   lowest	   levels	   ever,	   with	   a	   base	   rate	   of	   0.25%	  over	  the	  whole	  period.	  	  
• The	   “economic	   costs”	   of	   the	   mortgage	   crisis	   costs	   each	   U.S.	   citizen	   another	  $24.267	  	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  since	  2008.	  	  
• Bubbles	  can	  occur	  in	  household	  debt,	  in	  government	  debt,	  in	  stock	  markets,	  in	  loading	   companies	   with	   more	   debts	   and	   in	   cross	   border	   debt	   especially	  through	  the	  internalization	  of	  the	  U.S.	  dollar.	  	  
• Spotting	   the	   danger	   point	   is	   difficult	   enough,	   but	   preventing	   the	   danger	  occurring	  needs	  a	   financial	   infrastructure.	  Central	  banks	  need	  to	   take	  a	  more	  pro-­‐active	  stand	  regarding	  cross-­‐border	  loans.	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• The	  International	  Monetary	  Fund:	   IMF	  Survey	  Magazine:	  Policy;	  April	  8	  2015	  Global	  Financial	  Stability	  Report:	  Plain	  vanilla	  investment	  funds	  can	  pose	  risks;	  	  
• Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  St.	  Louis,	  B100	  and	  B101	  Balance	  Sheet	  of	  Households	  and	  Non-­‐profit	  Organizations,	  Quarterly	  and	  annual	  publication;	  	  
• The	   evil	   force	   of	   borrowing	   and	   the	  weakness	   of	   Quantitative	   Easing	   by	  Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning,	  7	  February	  2015	  http://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/61970/	  	  
• USgovernmentdebt.us	  presented	  by	  Christopher	  Chantrill,	  Seattle,	  Washington	  State,	  quarterly	  and	  annual	  updates.	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